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«I was resolved not to be un enthusiast in philosophy, 
while 1 was blaming other enthusiasms» 
David Hume, letter to Henry Home, 
December 2. 1737~ 
RESUMEN: Una de las interpretaciones más frecuentemente formuladas respecto de la conexión que 
históricamente se ha dado entre el liberalismo y el empirismo, en laEuropa moderna-y más particularmente 
en la Gran Bretaña-, supone que dicha relación pasa decisivamente por la separación entre hechos y valores. 
entre lo descriptivo y lo evaluativo. El pluralismo y la tolerancia que el liberalismo pretende implicar 
solamente pueden apoyarse en la al menos relativa separación de los valores del mundo fáctico donde 
predomina el criterio de verdadero-falso. 
Michael Rosen, actualmente profesor del Lincoln College de Oxford, quiere poner aprueba esa interpretación 
en un caso histórico concreto: el del "entusiasmo" religioso en algunas confesiones cristianas, y los análisis 
epistemológicos y socio-psicológicos que diversos autores efectuaron de dicho fenómeno. De enke ellos se 
hace expresa referencia a Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith y otros, pero muy especialmente a David Hume, autor 
de un intento único de constmcción de una teoría capaz de interconectar las creencias, las emociones y la 
organización social. 
La conclusión de la pmeba, según Rosen, es la extremada simplificación que la tesis examinada contiene. por 
cuanto +n el tema analizad* la presunta separación no se realiza. Esta constatación no menoscaba la 
importancia que tal división ha tenido en la filosofía empirista, pero su protagonismo tuvo lugar en época 
bastante posterior a la previamente supuesta. 
1s there a connection between liberalism and empiricism? Historically, at least, the 
supposition seems more than likely. The emergence in early modem Europe (Chiefly 
J. H. Burton, Life and Correspondence ofDavid Hume, 2 Vols. (Edinburgh, 1856) Vol. 1, p. 64 
in Britain) of the characteristically liberal approach to politics coincided almost exactly 
with the development of empiricism in epistemology. Indeed, a single figure, John 
Locke, was of central significance in both developments. It is hard to believe that the 
association was merely coincidental. 
What is more, a simple and obvious argument for the connection suggests itself at 
the leve1 of ideas. Liberalism is a doctrine of pluralism: it remains, to use a familiar 
phrase, ((neutral between competing conceptions of the good». But is it rational to be 
neutral? If questions about what is good could be true or false, then surely it would be 
wrong to treat different views as being of equal weight. On the other hand, if such 
questions are not questions of fact at all, then there appears to be no reason why one view 
should be privileged over another. Thus, it is argued, the empincist distinctions between 
facts and values supports the liberal approach to politics. 
This argument is, of course, consistent with a familiar criticism of liberalism: that 
liberalism defends the plurality of values only at the pnce of undermining what it seeks 
to defend; that it compromises the value i t ~ e l f . ~  
In this paper 1 propose to put this very simple model to the test in relation to a specific 
issue: the nature of enthusiasm. Enthusiastic religion represented a pressing social 
problem for the political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. More- 
over, it was a problem which clearly had an epistemological dimension. For what was 
distinctive about the enthusiasts was not just what they believed but the basis on which 
they claimed to believe it: the authority of direct divine revelation. The intellectual 
response to religious enthusiasm illustrates, 1 believe, how apparently quite abstract 
epistemological reflections may carry a latent political dimension. 
1 
Liberalism was not the direct political expression of Protestantism in the way that 
Scholastisc political theory had been the application of Catholic theology - e a r l y  
Protestantism was in obvious ways a conspicuously illiberal phen~menon .~  
It would be better to see liberalism as the product of the political problem which the 
Reformation represented. As Protestantism showed itself to be neither (as the Roman 
Church has hoped) a transient sectarian movement, nor (against the hopes of its own 
founders) a thoroughgoing movement for renewal within the Church, it became clear 
that religious pluralism was to be a permanent feature of the Western European political 
order. How was it to be acc~mmodated?~ 
~Liberalism more largely, for al1 its achievements, or as a kind of necessary constraint on those 
achievements, has been parasitic not only on older institutions and communities. And these latter it has 
progressively undemined. For liberalism is above al1 a doctrine of liberation». M. Walzer, Radical Prin- 
ciples: Reflections of un Unreconstructed Democrat (New York, N .  Y.: Basic Books, 1980), p. 97. 
~Luther ,  Zwingli and Calvin alike desired to establish inclusive churches and to support them with civil 
power, to make admission a matter of form and law and even to enforce membershipn. J .  W. Allen, A Histoty 
o Pol~tical Thought in rhe Sixteenth Century (London: Methuen, 1960), p. 41. ' r i a t  a diversity of rival and incompatible conceptions of the good should obtain the allegiance of a 
variety of contending parties was from now on increasingly to be taken for granted. The practica1 question 
becamerather: What kind of pnnciples can require and secure allegiance in and to a f o m  social order in which 
individuals who arepursuing diverse andoften incompatibleconceptions of the goodcan live together without 
the disruptions of rebellion and interna1 war?» Alasdayr MacIntire, Whose Justice? Which Rationalip? 
(London: Duckworth, 1988). 
In essence, the liberal strategy is one, as one might cal1 it, of «depotentiation». If 
shared religious belief no longer provides a plausible foundation for political order, the 
answer is not to search for ways to re-established uniformity (the conservative strategy) 
but to find a basis for political order wich bypasses the need for it. There are two main 
elements in this process. First, an examination of the possibility on an individualistic 
foundation for political obligation. Second, a reassessment of the status of religious 
belief and its social consequences. Together, the two elements help to initiate a vision 
of a new form of political society, based on social pluralism and the protection of rights. 
The problem of what, other than a shared religiously based morality, was to hold 
together the political community, was first diagnosed in the wntings of Machievelli and 
Hobbes. Both writers saw severa1 reasons to be sceptical about the political role of 
Chnstian morality. It was unreasonably dangerous, they argued, for a society to rely on 
its citizens behaving, by and large, as Christian morality told them they ought. 
For Hobbes, the «natural passions» of men, being «contrary to justice)), must be 
overridden by «terrour of some power».5 The subject is denied the entitlement to follow 
his own conscience with regard to right and wrong («because the Law is the Publique 
Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided»);6 individuals do not 
even have the capacity to make judgements regarding their own long-term self-interesL7 
Religion is to be tightly controlled by the sovereign for the sake of public safety. While, 
for the scholastics, «an unjust law is no law», for Hobbes there is no independent 
political standpoint from which the justice or injustice of a law may be judged. In 
general, to place any limitation on the sovereign's power is, Hobbes insist, given that the 
preservation of order is the ovemddiig.end, to deny him'the means necessary to that end. 
Liberalism in the centunes that followed challenged every one of Hobbes's social 
doctrines. Yet the basis on which it did s o  remained recognisably indebted to him. The 
liberals' quarrel was not with his assertion of the primacy of public safety but with his 
assessment of its requirements. It is here that the second element in the liberal strategy, 
the rethinking of the nature and status of religious belief, comes to the fore. Where 
Hobbes sees the need for state-imposed uniformity, the liberals' arguments deny its 
political necessity. What he sees as divisions need be, they argue, no more than diversity. 
11 
Locke, in the Letter Concerning Toleration, does not deny that the magistrate is 
responsible for the preservation of civil peace and that he may therefore intervene in 
religious matters insofar as they represent a threat to it. But, Locke argues, this does not 
imply that the magistrate should seek to impose uniformity. On the contrary, it is the 
attempt by churches to establish religious monopolies which is itself, in fact, the 
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C.B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 224. 
Hobbes, op. cit., p. 366. 
«For al1 men are by nature providedof notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love), 
through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses, 
(namelly Moral1 and Civil Science), to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without 
such payments be avoyded)). Hobbes, op. cit., p. 239. 
fundamental cause of religious strife. Diversity of religious belief is natural, Locke 
thinks, even among Christians -the scriptures do not uniquely determine a particular 
set of doctrines and practices. Moreover, the attempt to impose uniformity will prove 
counterproductive. 
The difficulty for Locke's position is easy to see: it may be apparent to Locke and 
those of a similarly tolerant disposition that, given the limitations of human cognitive 
capacities, certain knowledge is out of the question in matters of religious dispute. But 
what about those believers who are prepared to suffer martyrdom for their convictions? 
Will they be prepared to regard their doctrines as matters on which reasonable men 
might have different opinions? 
As the most recent editor of the L e t t e r  Concerning T o l e r a t i o n ,  James Tully, has 
pointed out, Locke had before him here the evidence of recent h i ~ t o r ~ . ~  The exarnple of 
Protestant martyrdom showed that post-Reformation man would suffer and die before 
submittin to religious practices at odds with his own imer convictions. 
From Locke's perspective, two religious groups present a particular difficulty for the 
advocate of toleration: Catholics (because they aim at a monopolistic form of religion 
with doctrinal interpretation based upon institutional authority) and «enthusiasts» - 
who claimed to draw their religious doctrine directly from divine i n ~ ~ i r a t i o n . ~  
The name «enthusiasm» was applied initially to those «God-possessed» Protestants, 
the Anabaptists (known in German as s c h w a e r r n e r ) . l 0  Although Martin Luther himself 
Introduction to John Locke, A Letter concerning Tolerarion (l689), edited by J. Tully (Indianapolis, h.: 
Hackett, 1983), p. 6. 
«There are two projects particularly dear to [Locke's] hem:  the first to advocate, if only within limits, 
religious toleration; the second, to undermine one particular sort of religion, 'enthusiasm', fanaticism, yet 
without weakening religious faith». J. Passrnore, «Locke and the Ethics of BelieS», Dawes Hicks Lecture, 
Proceedings ofthe Brirish Academy, Vol. LXIV (1978), pp. 185-208, p. 186. The idea that there is a similarity 
between Chatolicism and extreme Protestantism is, of course, politically very understandable in the context 
of England after the end of the Commonwealth. It is one of the themes of George Hickes's sermon «The Spirit 
of EnthusiasmExorcised» (1680, publishedLondo 1709) and is continued in Hume's essay «Of Superstition 
and Enthusiasmn. 
By the time of Kant, however, enthusiasm and Schwaermerei were clearly distinguished -at least in 
German 
According to the Oxford English Dictlonnaty, the word appears fust in English in 1579, with no pejorative 
sense but meaning direct, divine possession. The OED illustration of the pejorative connection between 
enthusiasm and extreme Protestantism comes from Hickman's history of 1674 (surely too late) while the f i s t  
indication of the more modem sense of enthusiasm (as inspiration and vigour of spirit, particularly in 
connection with aesthetics) comes from Dryden (1693) who writes of poetry operating «by a kind of 
enthusiasm or extraordinary ernotion of soul». 
But in other languages this sense appears to be earlier and fundamental. The Historisches Woerrerbuch der 
Philosophie (Basel: Schwabe, 1972), Anicle: «Enthusiasmus», locates it as a part OS the Renaissance theory 
ofpoetry (to befoundinL. GiacomUii,DelF~~rorPoetico,forexarnple) while WemerKraus, «Ueberfranzoesisch 
'enthousiasme' im 18. Jahrhundert»,in WerkundWort.AufsaefzezurLiteratum~issensci~aftundWortgesciiichte 
(Berlin-Ost, 1972) pp. 178-204 cites Ronsard (1548) as its earliest appearance in French. The German term 
«Begeisterung)) seems never to have had the negative sense OS «enthusiasm» (that was reserved for 
Schwaermerei) and to relate back directly to the Platonic theory of inspiration. The negative sense at issue in 
this paper was still being used in English, however, in the 1840s by Emerson. 
had justified his actions in rebelling against Rome and breaking his monastic vows on 
the ground that he had received a divine summons, by the seventeenth century, in the 
opinion of the sociologist, Kai Enkson, «no item stood higher on the h r i t a n  list of 
heresies than the Claim that God revealed himself directly to men .~ . "  God may haved 
spoken directly to Abraham (even commanding him to commit a temble cnme) but that 
was before the Word of God had been published in its final form in the Scriptures. Where 
those professing to speak with divine authonty appeared within Puntan societies they 
were repressed with funous savagery. 
Erikson provides a stnking illustration of this during the course of the tnal of Anne 
Hutchinson in Massachusetts in 1637. The tnal had been dealing with Mrs Hutchinson's 
alleged subversion of the authonty of the clergy and had become involved in what was 
evidently (even by the standards of the time) a highly abstract discussion regarding the 
doctnne of the ((covenant of grace». At this point, however, Enkson says, 
It was Anne Hutchinson herself who came to the court's rescue ... [She] suddenly 
launched into a long account of her own life and ended the recital by declaring that her 
insights were a result of direct revelation. 
The judges immediately fastened on this: 
MR. NOWELL: How did you know that this was the spint? 
MRS. HUTCHINSON: How did Abraham know what it was God did bid him to 
offer his son, it being a breach of the sixth commandment? 
DEP. GOV. DUDLEY: By an immediate voice. 
MRS. HUTCH1NSON:So to me by an immediate voice. 
DEP. GOV. DUDLEY: How? An immediate revelation? 
MRS. HUTCHINSON: By the voice if His own spint to my soul.12 
This was clearly «devilish delusion»; «it is», said Gov. Winthrop, «the most 
desperate enthusiasm in the world».13 
For the sanctimonious Puritans of New England, matters were simple enough: 
whoever disagree with them clearly deluded, and such delusions could be of devilish 
inspiration. For Locke, however, the moral is a different one: to pretend to infallible 
knowledge through divine inspiration is to make a claim which, in the nature of the case, 
cannot be substantiated and which is, to boot, highly dangerous. It is this argument 
which 1 will now examine. 
l1  K. Erikson, KTa'ayivard Puritans, (New York, N. Y.: Wiley, 1966), p. 98. Nigel Smith has pointed out to 
me that this is an oversimplification: that there was in fact a spectrum of views conceming the nature of 
revelation and its location. Those who believe in direct personal revelation (the «immediate voice») are at one 
extreme. One common position appears to have been to deny that directrevelationnow is apart of the Christian 
experience in the way that ithad been in the early Church-that the «ageof rniracles)) is past. See, forexample, 
Hickes's «The Spirit of Enthusiasm Exorcised)). 
l 2  Wayward Puritans, p. 97. 
l 3  KJayward Puritans, p. 99. 
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Locke only became a defender of toleration at a comparatively late stage in his 
career. Earlier, he had taken a position which came much closer to Hobbes's: the 
magistrate ought to determine the form of religious observante for the sake of civil 
peace.14 But the central premise is the same in both arguments. Locke draws on a 
distinction brought to prominence by Hooker between those religious doctnnes which 
are fundamental questions of faith and reason and those which are «things indifferent)). 
In the case of xthings indifferent)), Hooker and the earlier Locke argued, since the issue 
was not something which could be definitely determined either by reason or revelation, 
it was open to the magistrate to prescribe practice.15 Later, however, Locke came to 
believe that for that very same reason these matters were to be left to the individual and 
his conscience. 
One can see that, if knowledge is impossible in matters of religious belief, then a 
simple argument for the limits of toleration can be constructed: al1 beliefs should be 
tolerated except those which lay claim to (certain) knowledge and, hence, to exclusivity. 
But, in fact, Locke does believe that there can be religious knowledge: the existence of 
God, for example, is something which, he argues, can be given demonstrative proof.16 
Thus Locke's is essentially a rationalist argument for toleratiori. It has two ingre- 
dients. First, there is the claim that there is a range of issues about which disagreement 
is reasonable and where tolerance of diversity is thus approppriate. Second, there is the 
idea that beliefs should have no claim to toleration which are irrational -not, it should 
be noted, in the sense that the beliefs themselves are intrinsically irrational (as regards 
their content) but because the belief is irrationally held. 
Locke's epistemology enables him to draw the necessary distinctions. He starts from 
a quasi-Cartesian conception of knowledge. The highest degree of certainty attainable 
by us is the directperception of the relation of ideas. This part of ourknowledge is, Locke 
says, ((irresistible, and like the bnght Sun-shine)) It: 
l4  Tully in his introduction to the Letter concerning Toleration points out that Locke's position in the Two 
Tracts, was not, however, one in favour of religious uniformity. Although the presumption is in favour of the 
prescription of religious practice by the magistrate, Locke seems to have been concemed to support the 
authority of the tolerant (because pro-Catholic) Charles 11 against attempts to impose strict religious discipline 
by the Anglican Church. Thus the authority of sovereign functions as a counterweight to the monopolistic 
tendencies of an established church. 
l5  «Hooker was really concemed only to show that refusal to obey duly constitutedauthority is justified only 
when the command given is demonstrably contrary to the law of God or the law of reason». Allen, op. cit., 
194. 
P6 But Locke &es take the position that the intolerant should not themselves be tolerated: ~ T h e s e  therefore. 
and the like, who aftribute unto the Faithful, Religious and Ortodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, 
any Peculiar Pnvilege of Power above other Mortals, in Civil Govemments; or who, upon pretence of 
Religion, dochallenge any manner of Authority over such, as are not associated with them in theEcclesiastica1 
Communion; 1 say these have no right to be tolerated by the Magistrate; as neither those that will not own and 
teach the Duty of tolerating Al1 men in matters of meer Religionn. Locke, op. cit., p. 50. 
... forces it self immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view 
that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is 
presently filled with the clear Light of it.I7 
Such intuitive certainty is foundational, insofar as it sets the goal for our wider 
cognitive activity. Proof, for example, is the attempt to supply by argument such 
intervening ideas as may be necessary in order to make the relation between ideas (which 
was not immediately apparent) intuitively certain. But, for Locke, the extent of certain 
knowledge is quite limited. It includes mathematical knowledge, intuitive knowledge 
of our own existence, and the direct evidence of sense, as well as some basic theorems 
of morality and theology (including demonstrative proof of the existence of God). 
Beyond that, however, we are in the domain of probability, not knowledge. 
In this case, the important point is that: «[t]hat which makes me believe, is something 
extraneous to the thing 1 believe».18 But here, too, the ideal of knowledge as intuitive 
certainty represents the guiding principle according to which probable reasoning ought 
to be directed. For where we take beliefs to be probable this has two kinds of grounds: 
first, there is conformity with what we actually do know, and, second, ther is the warrant 
that we give to the testimony of others. 
On this view, it is not unreasonable to believe on the basis of revelation. For, if there 
is a benevolent Creator -and this, Locke believes, is demonstrable- then it is not 
implausible that he should make his will known directly to men. And such communi- 
cation must be accorded the highest weight, being «the Testimony ... of such an one, as 
cannot deceive, nor be deceived».19 
What God reveals is incontrovertible. But what is by no means incontrovertible is 
the belief that God has revealed aparticular belief as true. While beliefs themselves may 
be justified by the inner light, there is no inner light which can show us that belief in a 
belief which is not intrinsically evident can be certainly true. Thus the existence of 
revelation must be itself be submitted to the standard of probability. This is not to say 
that God cannot reveal as true what is to us highly improbable, but only that our belief 
that such a thing is a revelation must be based on externa1 standards of evidence, not 
interna1 ones of certainty: 
... Faith is a setled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no room 
for Doubt or Hesitation. Only we must be sure, that it be a Divine Revelation, and that 
we understand it right: else we shall expose ourselves to al1 the Extravagancy of 
Enthusiasm, and al1 the error of wrong Pnnciples, if we have Faith and Assurance in 
what is not divine ~ e v e l a t i o n . ~ ~  
l7 JohnLocke,An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H .  Nidditch, (Oxford: O.U.P., 1975), 
p. 531. 
18 Locke, op. cit., p. 655. 
l9 Locke, op. cit., p. 667. 
20 Locke, op. cit., p. 667. 
This is where the enthusiast goes wrong. Faith cannot convince us of anything which 
contradicts our knowledge because «the Mind of Man can never have a clearer ... 
Evidence of any thing to be a divine Revelation, as it has of the principles of its own 
~ e a s o n » . ~ l  
The Enthusiast claims evidence on the basis of an interna1 light, but «light in the 
Mind» cannot relate to anything but the intrinsic evidence of the truth of a proposition; 
it cannot be evident independently of it: 
In al1 that is of Divine Revelation there is need of no other Proof but that it is an 
inspiration from GOD: For he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be 
known, that any Proposition in our Minds in a Truth infused by God; a Truth which is 
revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here 
it is that Enthusiasm fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For Men thus possessed boast 
of a Light whereby they say, they are enlightened, and brought into the Knowledge of 
this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they must now it to be so either by its 
own self-evidence to natural Reason; or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be so.22 
Reasonable belief may extend beyond knowledge, but what is not reasonable is to 
extend the standard of knowledge itself. The enthusiast might argue that he has not done 
this: he has only widened the application of Locke's notion of the «Clear L igh t~ .  If it 
is m e  that we perceive by a clear light that two and two are four or that there is a red 
patch before our eyes, why should it not equally be clear to someone that they are being 
addressed by the Deity? 
Exactly this claim was made by one Walter Cradock in a workcalled Gospel-Holznesse 
(1651). Cradock argues that: 
... for as in natural things, you know, that by the same light wereby 1 see the sun, by 
the same light 1 know that 1 see him: So there is in the very manifestation of God to the 
soule, it carries a witnesse in it self, it is so cleare that when 1 have it, though 1 never had 
it before, and 1 cannot demonstratively speak a word what it is, yet 1 know as it is Gods 
sight, so 1 know as 1 see him.23 
Put like this, the gap between Locke and the enthusiast might appear to be small: the 
enthusiast simply extends the range of material which meets the criterion of the «clear 
light». But there is, Locke believes, an epistemological principle at stake here. What 
would be involved in accepting the enthusiast's claims, and why Locke resists them so 
vehemently, would be to allow that there could be evidence for a belief which was purely 
extrinsic +vidente, that is, which could not in some way be connected back to the 
belief's intrinsic plausibility. To accept this would be to contradict the principle that 
belief on evidence is prior to belief on authority (in the sense that authority is justified 
only if it embodies evidence in an indirect forrn) and this principle is fundamental to 
Locke's vindication of the nghts on individual human reason. 
21 Locke, op. cit., p. 693. 
22 Locke, op. cit., p. 702. 
23 Walter Cradock, Gospel-Holinesse (165 1) p. 32, quoted in A .  A. Coppins, Religious Enrilusiasnzfion~ 
Roberi Browne (o  George Fox ( D .  Phil., Oxford, 1983), p. 219. 
On the face of it, Locke's argument against the enthusiast might be formulated like 
this: no second-order proposition of the form «'p' is true» can be self-evident unless the 
first-order proposition «p» itself is. Such a claim might appear to follow from Locke's 
commitment to the «way of ideas». If knowledge is, as Locke says, a matter of grasping 
the «connexion and agreement)) between ideas,24 then, by a sort of «atomic pnnciplen, 
our grasp of the relations within a second-order proposition cannot be detached from our 
grasp of the relations within any first-order proposition which it contains. Hence the 
second-order proposition could not be evident if the first-order one were not evident 
also. 
But this argument does not work for two reasons. First, it commits Locke to a claim 
which is far stronger than the should be prepared to make. The «atomic principie)) just 
mentioned would amount to the claim that we cannot have knowledge of the relations 
between ideas whose own (intemal) relations we did not fully know. If that were so, 
however, it would imply that we could not know any propositions about God without 
knowing al1 the necessary truths about his nature, or know any necessary properties 
which a mathematical object may have without knowing al1 such properties. That way 
madness lies - o r  Leibniz. 
What is more, this way of stating the argument misrepresents the position of Locke's 
opponent. The enthusiast is not, in fact, claiming that, though a proposition itself is not 
self-evident, its truth is. His position is something more like a syllogism: 
(1) Whatever is told me by God is certainly true. (This premise is accepted by both 
Locke and the enthusiasts). 
(2) God has told me p .  
(3) Therefore, p is certainly true. 
Since the form of the argument is trivially valid, its weight rests on (2), which the 
enthusiast claim is a matter of direct experience. In that case what is at issue does not 
depend on the distinction between first and second-order propositions at all. For Locke 
must surely concede that 1 can know a proposition of the form «X told me p» without 
knowing whether p is true. (1 can know that «John told me that he couldn't find my 
housex is true without knowing whether what John told me was itself true or whether 
he was simply inventing an excuse for his being late). So the question is: could 1 ever 
directly know that God has told me something? If so, then 1 have interna1 evidence for 
aproposition of the form «X toldmepx which, in conjunction with the principle of God's 
veridicality, provides good indirect evidence forp  itself. The question of extemal evi- 
dence for p does not arise. 
Locke's claim must be that 1 could not recognise God's voice just from the 
experience of hearing it (in the way that 1 might recognise a duck-billed platypus when 
1 see it, never having seen one before). This does seem to be the implication of the 
account he gives of our idea of God, which he describes as the idea of a «complex idea 
of substance» which transcends «any thing, we can perceive in ourselves by Reflection, 
or discover by Sensation in other t h i n g s ~ . ~ ~  But since, on the other hand, Locke allows 
24 Locke. op. cit.. p. 525. 
Locke, op. cit.. p. 317. 
that we can have direct (and, presumably, self-identifying) awareness of our own willing 
and thinking, even though nothing in the extemal world corresponds to them, why, the 
enthusiast will ask, could we not have such awareness of the Spirit moving within us? 
Rather than applying an epistemological principle, Locke, in excluding the possibility 
of an immediate awareness of the Spirit, would appear to be assuming his conclusion. 
But even if there are flaws in the specific arguments Locke gives in the chapter «Of 
Enthusiasm», the general principle he defends -the priority of belief on evidence over 
belief on authority- may now seem to us simply a matter of epistemological common 
sense. If so, then Locke and his contemporaries have achieved the most conclusive kind 
of historical victory available to philosophical doctrines: one which suppresses the 
awareness of an altemative in those who come after. 
For, at the time that Locke was writing, an altemative view was seriously and widely 
canvassed. As the workof RichardPopkin and others has shown, the founders of modem 
epistemology wrote against a background of arguments defending faith as a groun for 
belief which was independent of (andperhaps, indeed, contrary to) reason and evidence. 
This is the point of view, for example, of those who combined philosophical scepticism 
with commitment to religious authority -a position which Popkin describes as 
« f i d e i ~ t » . ~ ~  For the fideist, unaided human reason is unable to make good even its own 
claims to knowledge, much less to be in aposition to challenge the immediate authority 
of revealed r e l & i ~ n . ~ ~  
On the face of it (and according to his own convictions) the enthusiast such as 
Cradock is wholly in line with Locke on this question: human beings must decide 
knowledge-claims according to their own interna1 standard of the «clear light)), not by 
extemal authority. Locke's argument, on the other hand, would place the enthusiast in 
the same category as the fideist. The enthusiast, he claims, introduces a standard for 
knowledge which transcends (and, potentially, is in conflict with) the ordinary proce- 
dures of rational argument and investigation -although in this case the standard is the 
Protestant one of direct illumination rather that the Catholic one of stablished ecclesiastical 
authority. 
Locke's account of enthusiasm, then, attempts to draw a line between divergences 
of belief which are reasonable and those which are not in the name of a unified 
conception of human reason. But why do people come to be «possessed» by such 
irrational beliefs? And what remedies are there? 
«[The] Mind if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine al1 the grounds of 
Probability, andsee how they make more or less, for or against any.probable Propo- 
26 «Those whom 1 classify as fideicts are persons who are sceptics with regard to the possibility of our 
attaining knowledge by rational rneans, without our possessing some basic tmths known by faith (i e truths 
based on no rationalevidence whatsoever)~ R Popkin, TheHlstoy ofSceptlclsm (Berkeley U of Califomia 
Press, 1979) p xix 
27 Thus whenLocke writes «Credo, gula imposstb~le st I belteve because ~t 1s lmpossible, might, in agood 
Mari pass for a Sally of Zeal, but would prove a very 111 Rule forMen to chuse their Opinions or Religion by», 
Locke, op cit , p 696, he is rejecting a view which was forcefully held by many of his contemporanes and 
immediate predecessors 
sition, before it assents to or dissents from it», Locke writes in the chapter «Of 
Probability». What keeps us on this path of reason, he goes on to claim in the chapter 
«Of Enthusiasm~, is a «love of ~ r u t h » . ~ ~  
J. A. Passmore in «Locke an the Ethics of Belief» sees a contradiction here. Indeed, 
he argues that this latter claim by Locke «entirely disrupts the argument he has so far 
developed and continues to develop in the chapter which now succeeds it». The reason, 
he says, is that «Locke now begins to describe rational belief not in terms of a purely 
intellectual weighing-up but rather in terms of a certain form of passion -the love of 
t r u t h ~ . ~ ~  1 must admit that 1 do not see the force of this objection. Locke appears only 
to be defending the view -surely not an unreasonable one- that it is up to us to put 
ourselves in a position to gather the best evidence we can in advance of making a 
judgement. The love of truth, if we have it, is what motivates us to take those active steps. 
It does not affect the c~weighing-upn itself; it determines (to continue the metaphor) how 
energetically we search for the materials that we put in the scales. 
In the penultimate chapter of the Essay Locke classifies the reasons why the «love 
of truth» may prove to be insufficient to prevent us from assenting «contrary to 
probability D. Of the four counteracting causes identified, three (conesponding, roughly 
speaking, to ignorance, stupidity and laziness) lead people to omit the necessary 
investigation prior to judgement and so to be unaware of the evidence available. There 
is no contradiction here with the picture of the act of judgement itself as a passive 
weighing-up. 
The fourth case dealt with by Locke -what he calls «wrong measures of prob- 
ability»- may, however, seem to support Passmore's charge of inconsistency, for in 
this case non-ratiorial factors do intrude on judgement: our emotions affect not just our 
willingness to gather evidence but our assessment of the probabilities themselves. 
But 1 do not see that even this has to be incompatible with a view of judging as 
basically « w e i g h i n g - ~ ~ » . ~ ~  The fact that we may misperceive the weight of certain 
factors for emotional reasons does not make the process ofjudgement itself less passive. 
Locke can consistently maintain both that we do indeed, when we judge, passively 
register the greatest apparent weight of probabilities and that, for emotionals reasons, 
we misperceive the true weight of one or more of the ingredients in our ca lc~la t ion.~ '  
28 Locke, op. cit., pp. 656, 697. 
29 Passmore, op. cit., p. 204. The chapter «Of Enthusiasmn was added by Locke to the fourth edition of the 
Essay and so might perhaps be expected not to be wholly consistent with what precedes and succeeds it 
30 Even if there were an inconsistency here, however, this would evidently not support Passmore's claim 
that the inconsistency was introduced into Locke's argument by the inclusion in later editions of the Essay 
of the chapter «Of Enthusiasm». 
31 1 sucpect that Passmore exaggerates the passivity of Locke's view ofjudgement because, in talking about 
Locke's account of ~rat ional  beliefn, he does not differentiate sufficiently sharply between what Locke has 
to say about knowledge (in regard to which we are, indeed, when the necessary conditions are present, 
supposed to becompletely passive -there is no «decision to belleve») and whathe has to say aboutjudgement 
and oplnron, in relation to which we take a more active role and which is where the «love of truth» comes in 
But, though it is not inconsistent for Locke to allow that emotional factors may 
intrude on judgements about matters of fact, what he has to say about the way in which 
they actually do so offers little help in explaining the origins of irrational religious belief: 
Locke contents himself with conventional platitudes on the subject, of no particular 
relevance to the problem of religious enthusiasm: 
Te11 a Man, passionately in Love, that he is jilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the 
Falshood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of hers, shall invalidate 
al1 their Testimonies. Quod i~olumus, facile credimus; what suits our wishes is forwardly 
believed, is, 1 suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented ...32 
When it comes to the psychology of rationality and irrationality, Locke has little to 
say: in general, he is content to show enthusiasm's epistemological distinctiveness and 
to leave the matter there. 
IV 
Alongside Locke's epistemological approach to enthusiasm there was, however, an 
increasing tendency in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to view enthusiasm, 
superstition, primitive religion and related phenomena from the point of view of what 
Frank Manuel has called «psychopathology~~.33 
The idea that enthusiasm was principally a matter of medical, not theological or 
philosophical concern can already be found in that source of so much that is character- 
istic of seventeenth-century English thought, Burton'sAnatomy ofMelancholy (162 I ) . ~ "  
Hobbes, too, mentions enthusiasm in Chapter Eight of the Leviathan («Of Mari))) as a 
species of madness. Similarly, the Anglican theologian, Meric Casaubon, published A 
Treatise concerning Enthusiasm (1655) with the subtitle: As it is un effect of nature: b14t 
is nzistaken by many for either Divine Itupiration, or Diabolical Possession. 
Casaubon's subtitle is significant. To represent enthusiasm as a medical or psy- 
chological problem is, of course, to disqualify it from a legitimate hearing in the sphere 
of reasonable debate and, to that extent, constitutes an intolerant response. But, in the 
seventeenth-century context: this must be set against the kind of savage repression 
traditionally practised by Christians against those whom they considered to be heretics 
and blasphemers. 
That advocates of the medical approach to enthusiasm were well aware of the 
contrast between their attitude and the fiercer forms of clerical reaction is made clear, 
for example, in the «Epistle to the Reader» of Henry More's E~zthusiasmus Triumphutus 
(1656). More presents an ironic dialogue between a first-person interlocutor and the 
author: 
32 Locke, op. cit.. p. 715. Locke does not, for exarnple. consider why anyone should want to believe wliat 
is not the case: does the disappointment in the long term not more than outweigh the pleasures of short-terin 
illusion? 
33 See F. Manuel The Eighieenth Cenricly Corfronts the Gods (Carnbridge, Ma.: Harvard U.P., 1959), Ch. 
3, Section 111. «A Psychopatology of Enthusiasrn». 
34 R. Burton, Tiie Anulonzy oflMeiunchoi~~ (London: Dent, 1977), Part 111. p. 341. 
1 asked him if it seemed not something maimed in the enumeration of the Causes of 
Enthusiasme, because there is nothing set down there concerning the Devil, nor the 
wilfull wickednesse of the mindof man; but al1 is resolved into Con~plesion or the present 
Temper or Distemper of the body, arising from natural causes that necessarilly act 
thereupon. For thus this Discourse, said 1, may seem as well an Excuse for, as Discovery 
of this disease of Enthusiasme. Why, said Mastix, 1 hope it is not your designe, 1 am sure 
it is not mine, to incense the mindes of any against Enthusiasts as to persecute them: al1 
that 1 am at, is only this, that no man may follow them.35 
Although Casaubon undertakes a typology of the different forms of enthusiasm - 
divinatory, contemplative and philosophical, rhetorical, poetical and precatory- he 
does not, however, go far towards offering a causal hypothesis regarding its origins. It 
is only at the beginning of the eighteenth century that writers on enthusiasm begin to 
move towards a differentiated psychological account of the phenomenon. 
A short workofthis kindis Trenchard's NaturalHisto~-~~ ofSuperstition (1709), which, 
according to Manuel, Hume himselfprobably perused (certainly the title is close enough 
to Hume's own Natur.al History of Religion). The Natural History of Superstition is an 
essay, as Manuel puts it, of «Deism m i l i t a n t ~ . ~ ~  Trenchard diagnoses enthusiasm as due 
to a blockage of communication with the real ~ o r l d , ~ ~  when «the Organs of Sense 
(which are the Avenues and Doors to let in externa1 objects) are chut u ~ » . ~ ~  The natural 
connection between the mind and the world thus being dislocated, there is a compen- 
satory stimulation of the imaginative faculties. 
More important for the contemporary image of enthusiasm, perhaps (and certainly 
more entertaining) are the satirical essays by Swift «A Tale of a Tub» and <<A Discourse 
concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit» (1704) in which Swift examines the 
((Fanatick Strain, or Tincture of Enthusiasm; which improved by certain Persons or 
Societies of Men, and by them practised upon the rest, has been able to produce 
Revolutions of the greatest Figure in ~ i s t o r y » . ~ ~  
According to Swift: 
Whosoever pleases to look into the Fountains of Enthusiasm, from whence, in al1 
Ages, have eternally proceeded such fatning Streams, will find the Spring Head to have 
been as troubled and muddy as the Current; of such great Emolument is a Tincture of 
this Vapour, which the World calls Madness, that without its Help, the World would not 
only be deprived of those two great Blessings, Conquests and Systems, but even al1 
Mankind would unhappily be reduced to the same Belief in Things ~ n v i s i b l e . ~ ~  
35 Henry More, Enth~tsiasmus Triurnphatus, in A Collection of Several Philosophical Wrirings 0fDrHeni.y 
More (London, 17 12). 
36 Manuel, op. cit., p. 72. «The Natural History of Superstitionn in A Collecrion of Scar-ce and Valuable 
Tracts on the mosr Inreresting and Enterraining Subjects, Vol. 111 (London, 1748), pp. 206-222. 
37 An idea, according to Manuel, he takec frorn Bayle. 
38 Quoted, Manuel, op. cit., p. 76. 
39 A Tale of a Tub and other- Satires, ed. by K .  Williams (London: Dent, 1975), p. 174. 
40 Swift, op. cit.. p. 107. 
For Swift, enthusiasm is either a form of madness or, more commonly, a fraud 
performed on the gullible by means of human vanity for essentially selfish p u r p ~ s e s . ~ ~  
These, then, were the two main strands of thought about enthusiasm current in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: the attempt to draw a dividing-line on the 
epistemological leve1 between the claims of the enthusiasts and reasonable religious 
belief, and the identification of enthusiasm as a form of psychological pathology. 
Locke's critique of enthusiasm, as we have seen, developed from his rationalist 
epistemology. But, for those who are less sanguine about the possibility of a rationalist 
account of knowledge, the idea of a clear dividing-line between reasonable belief and 
enthusiasm might seem to be more remote. For a sceptic like Hume al1 too many of our 
beliefs lack a foundation in reason. Are we then, in Hume's view, in no better case than 
the «gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast)) h i m ~ e l f ? ~ ~  Not necessarily. 
The fact that Hume holds that there is no foundation in reason for certains beliefs 
should not lead us to attribute to him the «theory that belief is not only natural, but also 
essentially i r r a t i o n a l ~ . ~ ~  By assumption, of course, we do not have an account which 
explains us as forming our beliefs for rational reasolls alotze, but that does not mean that 
they are arbitrary. In the first place, Hume does have a theory of rational belief, both in 
the sense of an account of the kinds of belief which it is reasonable to hold and of the 
processes andprocedures (that is to say, involuntary and voluntary factors) which favour 
the formation of reasonable beliefs. 
What is more, the attempt to look at beliefs and their formation from a «naturalistic» 
perspective can have its own kind of normative content. The nature which «by an 
absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well to breathe and 
feel» is, by and large, beneficent and w e l l - ~ r d e r e d . ~ ~  Indeed, Hume points out, it is 
actually hetter that we should form many of our beliefs by instinct. rather than having 
to rely on the slow and often uncertain processes of r e a ~ o n i n g . ~ ~  
41 «So there is one fundamental Point. wherein they are sure to meet. as Lines in a Center, and that is the 
Commilni0; of Women: great were their Sollicitudes in this Matter, and they never fail'd of certain Articles 
in their Schemes of Worship, on purpose to establish it ... For Human Life 1s a continua1 Navigation, and, if 
we expect our Vessels to pass with Safety. thro' the Waves and Tempests of this fluctuating World, it is 
necessary to make a good Provision of the Flesh. as Sea-men lay in a store of Beef for a long Voyage». Swift. $5. cit., p. 188. 
Hume,An Enquiry Concerning [he Principies ofMoruls, Sect. I X ,  Part 1, in DavidHume, Enquiries, Third 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford U.P.. 1975), p. 270. 
43 This. according to David Fate Norton, is the interpretation of «Kemp Smith and his followers», David 
Hiime: Conirnon-Sense Morulist, Scepticul ii4etaph~~sician (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1982). p. 16. 
although this seems to me an ungenerous view of Kemp Smith. See N. Kemp Smith The Ph~losopizy ofDavid 
Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941). 44 Hume, A TI-eatise ofHuman Naiitre, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: O.U.P., 1968), p. 183. 
45 
«It is more conforn~able to the ordinary wisdonl of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by 
some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first 
appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of al1 the laboured deductions of the understanding. 
As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us knowledge of the muscles and nerves. by which 
they are actuated; so she has implanted in us an instinct. which carries forward the thought in a correspondent 
course to that which she has established among extemal objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and 
Thus the subject of irrational belief does not simply fa11 by the wayside for Hume. 
On the contrary, the simple (some would say, simplistic) mechanism of association 
allows Hume to develop (1) a naturalistic account of error (2) an account of interaction 
of belief and emotion in the genesis of false belief, and, finally, (3) in outline at least, 
an account of the connection between false belief and social circumstances. In this way, 
Hume brings together and unifies for the first time the two kinds of response to religious 
enthusiasm. 
v 
Hume's essay «Of Enthusiasm and Superstition» itself is, it must be admitted, a 
slight piece of work. But, read in the light of the later The Natural Histoly of Religion 
(1757), it makes clear how far Hume had gone in extending the theory of association 
developed in the Treatise to deal with the social problem of irrational belief. 
The origin of enthusiasm and superstition, according to Hume, lies in the intrusion 
onto the formation of our beliefs of our hopes and fears (respectively). The beliefs which 
are formed in this way are not sheer hallucinations, however. The imaginative mecha- 
nism in operation corresponds rather to what would, in modern terms? be called a theory 
of projectior? or f e t i ~ h i s r n . ~ ~  
«There is», writes Hume: 
an universal tendency among mankind to conceive al1 beings like themselves, and 
to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are familiarly acquainted, 
and of which they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon, armies 
in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by expenence and reflection, 
ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases 
Let us examine this passage from the point of view of the theory of association. 
According to Hume, although ideas are associated by resemblance, contiguity and 
causation, impressions are associated solely by the principle of resemblance, and so, 
presumably, it is resemblance that initially moves us to identify the impression of a 
certain «figure» (say, the shape which corresponds to the shape of a human face) with 
what it commonly resembles, namely, the idea of a face. 
The error in this is one of interpretation: to believe that whatever looks like a face is 
a face (in the sense of conforming to whatever empirical laws govern faces). A more 
forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends)). Enquir): concer.tzing Hunlut~ 
Understunditzg, Sect. V, Part 2, in Hume, op. cit., p. 55, my emphasis. 
It is true, as a famous letter to Hutcheson makes clear, that Hume had reservations about the extreme kinds 
of teleological argument then current. But one does not have to believe that everything is for the best in the 
best of allpossible worlds in order to findsome causal connecrions beneficent: this, 1 believe, is what is implicit 
in Hume's phrase about: «the ordinary wisdom of naturen. 
46 The latter term is, if Manuel is right, not so anachronistic. The general use of the term «fetishism» to refer 
to animistic religious belief comes from Hume's French contemporary Charles de Brosse's Du Culte des 
Diecu Fetlches, a work which Manuel claims to have been directly inspired by Hume, and which was the 
source for Marx's famous concept of the ((fetishism of commodities». If that is so, then Hume has some right 
to be seen as one of the progenitors of the modern theory of ideology. 
47 Hume, The Natural History of Religion, edited by H.E. Root (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford U.P., 1985), p. 29. 
refined judgement, based on causality will enable us to amend our classification so that 
we judge that what we see is a face-shaped heavenly body, conforming to the laws 
governing heavenly bodies, not the face of some person in the sky. On this view, then, 
error lies in endorsing the immediate consequences of the principle of association, 
rationality the revision of immediate generalisations in the light of more extensive and 
systematic data. Since this process is indefinite, the difference between truth and error 
becomes one of degree. 
In this way, Hume answers an objection to his naturalistic account of the human mind 
which he considers in Book One of the Treatise. The objector, as Hume describes him, 
takes Hume to be committed, in consequence of his view that «al1 reasonings are nothing 
but the effects of custom», to the belief that «our judgement and imagination can never 
be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as 
to render it opposite to the former» -in other words, that experience and habit can never 
be misleading because that, in the end, is al1 that knowledge itself amounts to.48 
But we can, and ought (Hume's word) to regulate our judgements about cause and 
effect by means of «general rules» -rules which enable us to separate «accidental 
circumstances from the efficacious causes»: 
The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and 
yet 'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and al1 other unphilosophical 
probabilities.49 
So far, them, Hume's account of irrational belief forms practically a caricature of an 
Enlightenment theory of progress. Irrationality is a matter of jumping to hasty conclu- 
sions through ignorance. What dispels illusion is the steady accumulation (and 
organisation) of data. But why on this account, one might ask, should mankind be 
subject to the particular delusion that al1 beings are like themselves? And where do the 
emotions -hope and fear- come in? In answering these questions it becomes apparent 
that Hume's theory is a good deal more sophisticated than at first sight appears. 
The Natural History ofReliglon suggests two answers, one, as it were, negative and 
the other positive, to the question of why we personify nature. The first is, indeed, a 
consequence of ignorance: it comes from our attempt not simply to find causes for 
events, but to make those causes intelligible to ourselves. Hume's own account of the 
ultimate explanation of reality is a characteristically «disenchanted» and materialist 
one: 
Could men anatomize nature, according to the most probable, at least the most 
intelligible philosophy, they would find, that these causes are nothing but the particular 
fabric and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of externa1 objects; and 
that, by a regular and constant machinery, al1 the events are produced about which they 
are so much c ~ n c e r n e d . ~ ~  
48 ibid. 
49 Treatise, p. 150. 
50 The Natural History ofReligion, p. 29 
But, lacking such a view of the world, the ((ignorant multitude» employ their 
imaginations in forming some «particular and distinct idea» of the unknown causes 
which govem their lives -indeed, philosophers themselves are hardly exempt from 
such i l l u ~ i o n s . ~ ~  
The positive answer complements this: men are led to form beliefs about the causes 
governing the natural world not from purely speculative motives but because of the 
effect -both fortunate and unfortunate- which the natural world has on their lives. In 
that case, we can see the following association: what is pleasurable has something 
benevolent as its source, what is painful something ill-disposed. The resemblance lies 
not so much at the purely perceptual level of resemblance (the cloud is taken to be an 
army because it looks like an army) as at the level of causal generalisation (aman hurts 
me because he wishes me harm; a stone hurts me so it must wish me harm too). 
But it is the account he gives of the interaction between emotion and belief which 
takes Hume's account beyond the naive picture of the gradual accumulation of 
enlightenment. In outline, the theory is exceptionally simple: 
(1) For an idea to be believed is for it to have a «force and vivacity)) by which it 
approaches that of an impression. That, as Hume always insisted (to the despair of his 
commentators) is al1 that belief amounts to.52 
(2) When we are in the grip of a passion our feelings are thereby aroused. 
(3) This emotion transfers itself-leaks over, as it were- to any idea which happens 
to be present, thus increasing its force and increasing the propensity to belief beyond 
what it would otherwise be. 
Hume illustrates what he has in mind in the Treatise with respect to the emotion of 
fear (the source of superstition) but what he says could equally apply to the over- 
optimistic emotions of the enthusiast: 
... aperson of sorrowful and melancholy disposition is very credulous of every thing 
that nourishes his prevailing passion. When any affecting object is presented, it gives 
the alarm, and excites immediately a degree of its proper passion; especially in passions 
who are naturally inclined to that passion. This emotion passes by an easy transition to 
the imagination; and diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object, makes us form 
that idea with greater force and vivacity and consequently assent to it...53 
On the face of it, this account appears to be viciously circular: the «affecting objectx 
excites its «proper passion» in the fearful person and leads them to believe in its 
presence. But, presumably, the fearful person is one who mistakes as fear-inspiring 
things which need to be fear-inspiring at all. In which case, the passion is improper, not 
proper, as Hume supposes -it would hardly be a sign of timorousness to be fnghtened 
by the real existence of a charging lion. 
But, if we allow that there is a kind of immediate supposition on the part of the 
perceiver, the circle does not have to be a vicious one. The process might be something 
51 ibid. 
52 Treatise, p. 119. 
53 Treatise, p. 120. 
like this: 1 hear a creaking on the stairs late at night. 1 think that it might be a burglar. If 
1 am timorous, then this excites my fear and the fear itself reacts back on the idea to 
produce belief. Emotion converts ideas which we might entertain into ones we believe. 
The relationship between belief and passions runs in both directions, Hume argues: 
belief, being more intense than a mere fancy, is better able to arouse the passions and, 
hence, to motivate us to action: 
... the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce 
in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions which are immediately present 
to the senses and perception.54 
What is more (though Hume does not explain exactly how) belief can counteract the 
passions: edespair has almost the same effect upon us as enjoyment, and ... we are no 
sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself 
v a n i s h e s ~ . ~ ~  
Knowledge can thus, to some extent, counteract superstitious or enthusiastic 
irrationality. Writers on Hume's epistemology seldom fail to mention the role of 
everyday life in counteracting the corrosive force of philosophical scepticism, but the 
contrary is also important to Hume: theoretical knowledge as a remedy for delusion. 
Hume would not be Hume, however, if he were so sanguine as to believe that knowledge 
was enough to dispel al1 our irrational beliefs. He represents the limitations of the 
remedies open to us with typically Humean irony: 
To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble means as these, that it is 
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, that the whole is greater than a part, 
that two and three make five; is pretending to stop the ocean with a bullrush. Will you 
set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your 
impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the 
destruction of philosophers.56 
In counteracting irrational belief, though knowledge may be of some help, it is to its 
emotional origins that we should chiefly look. In principle, according to the theory of 
association, the source of irrational belief could be in any emotion: al1 passions make 
one credulous. But Hume has particular reasons to single out hope and fear as the sources 
of enthusiasm and superstition. 
Hope and fear, Hume says, arise when circumstances which would give us joy or 
grief are only probable and uncertain. Uncertainty is a kind of oscillation between 
conflicting views, none of which we can settle on: we move betweetz joy and sorrow as 
we momentarily judge the event true or false. In this way, the passions do not cancel each 
other out but (since they have the same object) Hume claims, synthesize to produce a 
third whose «agitating» power is particularly intense. It is this oscillation which gives 
hope and fear their particular psychological power when it comes to upsetting the 
reasonable processes of judgement. 
54 Trearise, p. 119. 
55 Trearise, p. xxii. 
56 The Natural History ofReligion, p. 54 
The connection between ignorance and irrational belief, then, is by no means as 
direct and simplistic as it appeared at first sight. Ignorante leads to uncertainty, 
uncertainty leads to hope and fear, hope and fear intensify the ideas produced by the 
imagination and so lead to credulity: 
In proportion as any man's course of life is governed by accident, we always find, 
that the encreases in superstition; as may particularly be observed of gamesters and 
sailors, who, though, of al1 mankind least capable of serious reflection, abound in most 
frivolous and superstitious apprehensions ... Al1 human life, especially before the 
institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents; it is 
natural, that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on 
the most earnest enquiry concerning those invisible powers, who dispose of their 
happiness or m i ~ e r y . ~ ~  
So it is apparent that Hume's position is some way from the complacent picture of 
a steady «march of mind» from error to reason. Knowledge, of course, will diminish 
uncertainty. But not al1 knowledge is equal in this respect: it is knowledge of those 
causes which affect our central concerns - o u r  health or our happiness- not abstract 
knowledge of natural laws for their own sake, which will have most effect in diminishing 
the kinds of uncertainty which lead to superstition and enthusiasm. 
What is more, of course, the sources of uncertainty are not purely intellectual: 
uncertainty can have objective origins in the lives people lead as well as subjective ones 
in their ignorance of the state of the world. It has often been noted how far stability and 
predictability are central political values for Hume (so much so that Hume's phrase in 
the passage quoted about the establishment of «order and good government» is 
practically a t a ~ t o l o ~ ~ ) . ~ ~  But if, as 1 have argued, Hume sees uncertainty as such a 
potent force in generating irrational belief, then the value of stability is underpinned by 
a kind of double argument: stability is both good in itself and as a way of avoiding 
unleashing the irrational side of human nature. 
This, then, is the outline of Hume's theory of irrational belief which forms the 
background to the essay «Of Superstition and Enthusiasm)). In «Of Superstition and 
Enthusiasm», however, Hume's intention is to confine himself, he says, «to a few 
reflections concerning their different influences on govemment and s o c i e t y ~ . ~ ~  His 
purpose is to point out the xdifferent and even ... contrary nature» of the two phenomena, 
rather than the similarity of their psychological origins. 
57 Tiie Natural Hisiory of Religion, p. 30. 
5 8  Indeed, this supposed ~conservatismu of Hume's thought may make him seem out of place in an account 
of the origins of the liberal tradition. 1 think that Duncan Forbes has dealt with this point of view quite 
conclusively: 
u...  it is not 'conservatism' but the sceprical Whiggism involved in the philosophical approach to politics 
which gives Hume's thought its unity and continuity. Scientific Whiggism was sceptical because it questioned 
the value and holiness of the holy cows of the Whigs: thejustification of the Revolution ... the contrast between 
English liberty and French 'slavery'; the 'ancient constitution' of the common lawyers and 'Comrnons' 
apologists in the seventeenth century and later modifications; the wickedness of the Stuart kings ... It is hardly 
surprising that this sort of thing appeared in the eyes of a good Whig like Horace Walpole, as 'Toryism', or 
worsex. D. Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge: Carnbridge U.P.,  1975) p. 139. 
Hume gives three reasons why, even ifhuman beings are prey to religious enthusi- 
asm, this does not present the kind of danger to settled and civilised society that 
superstition does. First, the initial violence of religious enthusiasm tends, Hume argues, 
to diminish of its own accord: «religions which partake of enthusiasm are, on their first 
rice, more furious and violent than those which partake of superstition; but in a little time 
become more gentle and modera te^.^^ Enthusiasts are, at least, resporzsive to toleration. 
Second, there is the idea -ent i re ly  consonant with Locke- that enthusiasm is not 
a political danger as such. Despite (or, indeed, because of) the violence of their religious 
convictions, the enthusiasts do not constitue the kind of monopolistic ecclesiastical 
force which presents the chief danger to religious and civil liberty. They are inclined to 
trust their own authority in religious matters (that, of course, is the source of their 
delusion) and so are less susceptible to the development of priestly power. 
Finally, their objective position is such as to make the multiplicity of enthusiastic 
religious groups «friends» to civil liberty.61 
Neither the rigid observances of the superstitious nor the fanatical self-certainty of 
the enthusiasts are traits which Hume finds at al1 attractive. But what makes superstition 
so dangerous is the way in which it is maintained in existence by groups «whose interest 
is concerned to support the religious ~ ~ i n t » . ~ ~  The irrational beliefs of the enthusiasts 
do not fix themselves into institutions which have a force of their own, however, and so 
they can be accommodated without leading to disaster. 
Ideas very similar to this can be found in the writing of Hume's close friend Adam 
Smith. Notoriously, Hume and Smith disagreed on the virtues of an established church, 
but their concern at the consequences of superstition for the development of priestly 
power (and, hence, their relative unconcern at the phenomenon of enthusiasm) is 
common. 
Smith's remedies for enthusiasm in the Wealth ofNations (1776) are two: education 
and disestablishment. «Science», Smith writes, «is the great antidote to the poison of 
enthusiasm and superstition; and wher al1 the superior ranks of people were secured 
from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to 
Smith discusses approvingly the way in which, where there is no established religion, 
the sects multiply to such a point that they are forced to learn to tolerate one another: 
The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged 
to respect those of almost every other sect. and the concessions which they would 
mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time 
probably reduce the doctnne of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, 
free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture or fanaticism, such as wise men have 
in al1 ages of the world wished to see e ~ t a b l i s h e d . ~ ~  
j9 aOf SuperstitionandEnthusiasm», inDavidHume,Essuys, Moral, PoliticulandLirerury, editedby Eugene 
F. Miller (Indianapolis, In.: Liberty Classics. 1987) pp. 73-80, p. 75. 
60 «Of Superstition and Enthusiasmn, p. 76. 
61 
«Of Superstition and Enthusiasmn, p. 78. 
62 «Of Superstition and Enthusiasmn, p. 77-78. 
63 Adam Smith, The Weulrh ofNurions, edited by E. Cannan (Chicago, 111.: U. of Chicago Press, 1976), 2 
Volumes, 11, p. 318. 
64 The Weult ofNutions. 11, pp. 314-15. 
Had England accepted the plan of ecclesiastical government («or more properly of 
no ecclesiastical government») proposed by the Independents («a sect no doubt of very 
wild enthusiasts») at the time of the Civil War, this scheme, Smith argues, ~ though  of 
a very unphilosophical origin, ... would probably by this time have been productive of 
the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of 
religious principle».65 
Smith's approach to enthusiasm is in many ways less sophisticated than Hume's, 
however: he gives much less emphasis to the recalcitrant emotional origins of irrational 
belief and so he is perhaps more naively optimistic about the effectiveness of disinter- 
ested knowledge and the «market-place of ideas» in dispelling its delusions. Here, as 
always, Smith's confidence in the underlying benevolence of the social order was far 
greater than Hume's more cautious awareness of the ever-present possibility of disaster. 
VI 
At the beginning of this paper, 1 suggested that it was my purpose to put the very 
simple model of a connection between liberalism and empiricism via the distinction 
between facts and values to the test. My first conclusion is that the model is just that: too 
simple. Clearly, whatever is at stake in the arguments concerning religious enthusiasm, 
it is not non-cognitivism or the distinction between facts and values. What is striking, 
indeed, is that, though Hume does make adistinction betweenfacts and values, he makes 
no use of it to separate off the political or religious sphere from the domain of rational 
argument. 
Where epistemological considerations are at work in the debate over enthusiasm, 
they concem such issues as: What is the proper authority over belief? and: What are the 
circumstances under which beliefs are reasonably formed? not any distinction in kind 
between the subject-matter of religious, moral or political beliefs, on the one hand, and 
beliefs about empirical reality on the other. The epistemological condition for a liberal 
theory of toleration seems to be the view that claims to religious knowledge should be 
submitted to fundamentally the same criteria as other beliefs -a view which follows 
from but by no means requires an empincist epistemology. 
This is not to say that the distinction between facts and values plays no role in the 
tradition of British liberal thought: it does, indeed, play a significant one. 1 believe. But 
it enters that tradition later than might be ~ u ~ ~ o s e d . ~ ~  
My second conclusion is that epistemological considerations form only a part of a 
theory of toleration: any satisfactory account of the problem of religious enthusiasm 
must deal, too, with the causes and consequences of irrational belief. One of the reasons 
65 The Weali of 1Varions. 11. pp. 313. 
66 The origin of the idea that the important dividing line is that between referential uses of language and 
expressivelemotive ones. and that poetry (and perhaps also religion and morality) are on the latter side, is 
discussed with immense perceptiveness and authority in M.H. Abran~s,  The Mirror. ancl rhe Lamp (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 1953). The implication of Abram's discussion 1s that the idea that «science» and 
«feeling» should coexist in separate spheres entered English culture as a kind of post-Romantic compromise 
in the course of the nineteenth century. 
why Hume's thought on the matter has a particular claim on our attention is that he 
endorses neither Hobbe's pessimism (which suggests that irrational belief is an 
ineradicable part of human nature) nor the meliorist confidence of the nineteenth 
century that civilised societies were now beyond such dangers: irrational belief, for 
Hume, is a permanent political problem, but not an entirely intractable one. 
Hume's remedy, part intellectual, part institutional, is a vital ingredient in his 
defence of modern commercial society, which alone, he argues, is capable of reconciling 
man's natural «love of gain» with the need for security and stability. But, whatever one 
may think of such political p resc~ ip t ions ,~~  they are the product of a unique attempt to 
I 
construct a theory which connects belief, emotion and social organisation to each other. 
Finally, 1 would like to draw attention to an episode in twentieth-century political 
thought which has a striking resemblance to the earlier response to enthusiasm. Just as 
the political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century had drawn a distinction 
between the reasonable diversity of religious beliefs and the unreasonable and danger- 
I 
ous enthusiasts, so, in the Cold War years, many liberal thinkers were to set the limits 
of the liberal polity in relation to «ideologists». The nineteen-fifties were, as Alasdair 
MacIntyre has put it, <<a decade of immoderate claims made on behalf of what its 
defenders took to be m o d e r a t i ~ n » . ~ ~  
C 
Here, too, there was an epistemological dimension to their claim. The characteristic 
of the ideologist was supposed to be that he is «totalitarian» -the ideological world- 
view lays claim to exclusively validity. But this, it was argued, is just to make the 
mistake of confusing value-judgements with statements of fact. So, again, an epistemo- 
logical doctrine was used to establish the limits of toleration -in this case, however, a 
I 
distinction drawn from the doctrines of contemporary logical positivism.69 
Any theory of toleration which is entitled to be taken senously must, of course, 
include an account of the limits of toleration. But the answer cannot be narrow the circle 
of toleration into triviality in this way: if the condition of toleration is that religious, 
I 
moral and political beliefs be completely subjectivised then liberal society will, indeed, 
be the kind of impoverished realm of individualist alienation its critics charge. That the 
liberal argument for toleration does not have to take this form is, perhaps, the lesson to 
be drawn from earlier thinkers. 
67 Many, of course, find them most sympathetic: Miller's -super& edition of the Essays was produced 
under the sponsorship of the Liberty Fundlnc. of Indianapolis, «a foundation established to encourage study 
of  the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals)). 
68 A. MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of rhe Age (London: Duckworth, 197 l),  p. 3. See C. Waxman (ed.) 
The End of ldeology Debare (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1968) for a representative sample of 
writings On the subject. 
69 ~~avaluejudgement disguised as or mistaken for a t a t e m e t o f  fact 1 shallcal an 'ideological statementh, 
Gustave Bergmann, quoted in R.  Geuss, The Idea o f a  Crltical Theory (Cambndge: Carnbridge U.P., 1981), 
p. 14. 
